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The role of nontraded goods has received considerable attention from
economists attempting to assess the relative merits of fixed versus flexible
exchange rate regimes. The traditional view is summarized in McKinnon's [10,
719] statement: "...if we move across the spectrum from closed to open
economies, flexible exchange rates become both less effective as a control
device for external balance and more damaging to internal price stability.
Yet, as is widely recognized, the classification of goods into traded or
nontraded depends upon the exchange rate. If an economy is not in long—run
equilibrium, its position on the spectrum from closed to open economies will
depend, in part, upon current exchange rate policy.
While there is little debate that changes in the exchange rate will change
the line of demarkation between traded and nontraded good sectors, there is
substantial controversy concerning the effects of the exchange rate on the
allocation of resources between sectors. One view is that floating rates,
inhibit international trade and investment; the net effects leading to fewer
resources in the export sector and more resources being allocated to the import
competing and, presumably, nontraded good sectors. Aliber [1, 178] presents
evidence that floating rates have increased exchange risk, price risk, and
hedging costs by a factor of five to ten. This evidence is used to support the
argument that: "Increased uncertainty about exchange rates is likely to lead
to a reduction in international transactions relative to domestic transactions,
and so production is less specialized internationally; the analogy is to a tax,
however modest, on international transactions..." When the exchange rate is •
considered to be an endogenous variable, Aliber's argument loses some of its
force. Flexible rates might encourage trade if the primary cause of exchange
rate variability is external price instability.
Another view stems from the observation that a change in the exchange rate
alters the relative price of,commodities. These relative price changes will
serve as .signals to resource owners so that flexible rates will induce resource
movements betwen sectors. Again, in assessing this argument, it is necessary
to consider the type of disturbance producing the exchange rate changes.
Kreinen and Heller [6], and Lanyi [8] argue that if disturbances originate in
the capital account, any resulting exchange rate changes can induce socially
wasteful changes in the allocation of resources. However, Thursby [13] argues
that exchange rate changes will lead to a reallocation of resources only if the
induced relative price changes are deemed to be of a permanent nature. In an
indirect test of this proposition, using a mix of empirical and simulation
techniques, Ihursby finds: "In a majority of our simulations we find no
significant difference in export variation under fixed and flexible rates..."
In our recent paper in this journal [2], we argued that there is greater
pressure for resource movements between sectors with fixed rates than with
flexible rates. Although resource allocations were assumed to be exogenous, it
was shown that price formation of nontraded goods is fundamentally different
under the alternative exchange regimes. The model used postulates that
commodity demands depend, in part, upon the domestic money supply and that the
money supply is constant with flexible rates but serially correlated (through
the balance of payments mechanism) with fixed rates.—^ As such, the demand for
and price of nontraded goods will be serially correlated with fixed rates but
not with flexible rates. On this basis we argued that resource allocations to
the nontraded goods sector (and hence the traded goods sector) should be
serially correlated with fixed rates but not with flexible rates, regardless of
the source of disturbances.
One problem with the works cited above (including our own) is Chat
resource allocation is not considered from a microeconomic/optimization
perspective. Papers by Helpman and Razin [4] and Lapan and Enders [9] have
extended Samuelson's [12] overlapping generations model to analyze exchange
regimes in a manner consistent with optimizing behavior. Rather than
postulating equations for aggregate macroeconomic equilibrium, behavioral rules
can be derived assuming that agents maximize expected utility and have rational
expectations. The behavioral rules of individuals are aggregated to obtain
market clearing conditions. The purpose of this paper is to extend the
overlapping generations model to consider the role of nontraded goods and the
effects of an exchange regime on resource allocation, tt will be shown that
the different distribution of prices under the two exchange regimes will lead
to differences in resource allocation for a small open economy. As opposed to
the Enders and Lapan results, the price of nontraded goods with fixed rates is
2/not necessarily serially correlated.— When labor allocations are endogenous,
labor movements between sectors will tend to eliminate any serial correlation
in prices. First, we show that if all goods are traded, resource allocation
and expected utility will be invariant to the exchange regime. In the presence
of nontraded goods it is shown;
1) With flexible rates, the amount of resources allocated to any one
sector will be constant over time. With fixed rates, resource
allocation will respond to circumstances within the domestic and
foreign economies. This is in contrast to the view that flexible
rates lead to more variability in resource allocations than fixed
rates.
2) The size of the nontraded goods sector is dependent upon the exchange
regime. A fixed rate acts to increase the average size of the
nontraded goods sector at the expense of traded goods so that more
resources are allocated to traded goods with flexible rates than with
fixed rates. T^e view that the preferred exchange regime depends upon
the degree of openness" must be modified when the size of traded and
nontraded goods sectors are endogenous. Our results also challenge
the view that flexible rates expand the import-competing sector and
contract the export sector.
Section II describes the model, derives the optimal decision rules for
individual agents, and considers aggregate macroeconomic equilibrium. The
nature of the model is such that individuals maximize expected utility and have
rational expectations. In Section III we solve the model for the case in which
there are only traded goods. It is shown that resource allocations are
invariant to the exchange regime and that individuals are indifferent to fixed
or flexilbe rates. Sections IV and V reintroduce nontraded goods and
demonstrate points 1 and 2 above. Conclusions and directions for further
research are presented in Section VI.
II. The Basic Model
In extending the overlapping generations model, we consider a small open
economy which produces two traded goods and a single nontraded good. The
purpose of including two tradables is to avoid the oversimplification that a
flexible exchange rate completely insulates the economy from external
disturbances. In accord with the Monetary Approach and the intergenerational
model, assume that:
i) AH individuals live for two periods. They supply one unit of labor
in the first period of life and are retired in the second. During
.the work period, the individual must decide how to allocate labor
time between each of two traded goods and a single nontraded good,
ii) Output of each of the three goods is stochastic, but expected output
of each is linear in labor time allocated to that good. Labor is the
only factor of production, and expectations concerning the stochastic
components of production conform to true probability distributions,
iii) Commodities are not storable across periods; further, the only store
of value for any individual is domestic currency.—^ Individuals
acquire domestic currency during their working period of life in
order to finance consumption when retired.
iv) In the beginning of their work period, each individual must decide
how to allocate labor time among the three commodities. At this
time, the individual's information set contains the true
distributions of the stochastic output disturbances and the mechanism
generating market clearing prices. When the labor allocation is
made, there is both price and output uncertainty. Once outputs are
realized, the individual must decide how much of each to consume
(sell). This decision is made with full knowledge of market clearing
prices. The proceeds of these sales (saving) are carried into the
retirement period. In the retirement period, the individual chooses
how much of each good to consume at market clearing prices. After
consumption in retirement, all members of the retired generation
leave the economic system, and a new generation is born to replace
them. The population is unchanging in that the working and retired
generations have the same number of people.
v) The world consists of two countries, one of, which is small in the
sense that the foreign currency prices of traded goods are
independent of its actions. The only policy decision of governments
is the choice between fixed and flexible exchange rates. If the
small country experiences a balance of payments deficit or surplus,
its money supply will change. The money supply effect in the large
country is negligible.
vi) All individuals have the same utility function, all maximize expected
utility, and all have rational expectations.
II.A The Individual Maximization Problem
Let all individuals have a utility function which is log-linear in the
consumption of each good in each period of life. The utility function of any
4/ ' .
member, of generation t is:~-
4
3
U= Z te.lnc. +e.lne,^_^J (1) •
. T 1 It 1 it+1
1=1
c^^ is the consumption of good i in period j, 0^ is a share parameter of the
utility function such that Z6^ = 1. As there are no interest-bearing assets,
and the individual works only in period t, the budget constraint is: .
3 3 t+1
^ =2 E p. .c.^ (2)
•i=l 1=1
P^j is the domestic currency price of good i in period j, and is the amount
of good i produced by a member of generation t. Production technology is such
that:
^it = ^it^it (3)
1^^ is the amount of labor time allocated to good i in period t, Zlj^^ = 1, and
a^^ is the stochastic production disturbance for good i in period t. The a^^
are identically and independently distributed with known means," finite
variances, and the disturbances across products are independent:
i=k and j=l
E(a..) = ; E(aya^^) = (4)
a a, otherwise
i k
We also assume that the realizations of the productivity disturbances are
identical for residents of a particular country, but productivity disturbances
and distributions may differ across countries. Letting starred (*) variables
represent the large country counterpart of the small country variables; for any
i and t, the a^^ are identical for all members of generation t in the small
country, but need not equal a^^ . As will be shown below, different
distributions of a versus a* will influence labor allocation decisions.
it It
Let m denote the amount of money that an individual born at t takes
t+1
into period t +1. Thus, in t+1, an individual born in period t will maximize:
3 3
1=1 1=1
Maximizing with respect to the yields the nominal demands for
commodities during retirement:
^it+l^it+l ~ ®i"*t+l ~
Given these consumption rules, the individual will select c^^ and
during period t in order to maximize:
3 3 3
ElZ e^lnc.^ + E " "t+l^
In equation 7) expectations run over the Define y^ to be the
individual's nominal income (y^ = Nominal consumption demands for
commodities during the work period of life are:
Pit^it = Siyt/2 (i = 1.3) (8)
and money holdings are:
™t+i yt/2 (9)
Using the decision rules given by equations 6, 8, and 9, the individual
will allocate labor time to maximize:
E(U) =E[kln(e.y^/2P.^) + .^ ^3^) ]
3 3 t+1
= E[2Ee.ln(0.y /2) - Z T. e.ln(P..)] (10)
1 i=l j=t ^
Which is equivalent to maximizing:
E[ln(Pitai^ll^ + P2t^2t^2t ^3t^3t^^"Ht"^2t^^ ^
with respect to Ij^^, and l2^; where the expectations operator runs over a^^ and
P. . The first order conditions for an interior solution are:
It
a. E[(Pi^t-®lt " ^ ®
b. E[(P2ta2t - P3t^3t^/ytl = 0 (12)
Equation 12) indicates that labor allocations will depend upon the
distributions of the and While there is little reason to suppose that
the productivity disturbances will be influenced by the exchange regime, price
distributions will depend upon whether the rate of exchange is fixed or
floating. As such, resource allocation will depend on the exchange regime via
the effect,s of the exchange rate on price distributions. In order to-determine
the price distributions under the alternative exchange regimes, we now analyze
market clearing conditions.
II.B Market Clearing Conditions
From the perspective of the small country, the foreign currency prices of
traded goods are exogenous while the price of the nontraded good is determined
internally. The market for the nontraded good clears when supply is equal to
the demand by the working generation plus the demand by the retired generation.
Let N denote the number of people in each generation. Since all residents of
the small country within a generation experience the same productivity
disturbances, aggregate supply of the nontraded good (say good 3) in period t
is: equation 8), each member of the working generation will
demand units of the nontraded good. Lagging time subscripts one
period in order to obtain the demand for the nontraded good at t by people born
in t-1, equation 6) indicates that a person born in t-1 will demand
units of the nontraded good. The market for the nontraded good clears when:
Na3t^3t = N03yt./(2P3t.) +
Under fixed exchange rates, the balance of pajrments is the difference
between the value of traded good outputs (good 1 and good 2) and the demands
for tradabies. Since there is no active monetary policy, the balance of
pajmients in period t is:
2
(14)
.Lastly, under any exchange regime, commodity arbitrage requires:
Pit = (15)
where e is the domestic currency price of the large country's currency. Under
fixed rates, e is fixed (for convenience at unity) while under flexible rates
the money supply is constant so that = Nm^ = M.
Given labor allocations and the distributionis (realized values) of the a
it
and > equations 13-15 can be solved for the distributions (realized values)
of the and either the money supply or exchange rate." Domestic price
distributions, however, are essential for determining the labor allocations-
(see equation 12). Thus, equations 12-15 must be solved simultaneously in
order to obtain the overall equilibrium. Before solving the system, it is
necessary to ascertain the mechanism generating foreign prices.
We let the structure of the large country replicate that of the small
country with the following exceptions;
i) All prices are determined internally.
ii) The money supply is constant, regardless of the exchange regime."
iii) While functional forms are equivalent, parametric values may differ
from those of the small country. Thus, production functions in the
large country are linear, but labor allocations and productivity
disturbances can differ across.countries.
Using starred variables to represent the large country counterpart of
small country variables, it is easily shown that:
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P*t = 2M*/ait (i = 1,3) (16)^
Individuals recognize that equation 16) determines the distribution of prices
in the large country. For simplicity, we normalize units such that m* = 1/2.
Under fixed rates P. = P* and P_ = P* , while under flexible rates the
relative price ratio of traded goods is ~ relative
price"ratios of traded goods are invariant to the exchange regime, and flexible
rates will not be ^ble to insulate an economy from external disturbances.
In order to highlight the role of nontraded goods, in Section III we
assume that 0^ is zero: in essence there are two traded goods. We demonstrate
that fixed and flexible rates are "identical" as long as there is no nontraded
goods sector. Section III serves as a reference, point for Section IV, which
reintroduces nontraded goods.
III. , The Completely Open Economy
In this section we consider the case in which there are no nontraded
goods. The analysis follows directly from Section II by letting the taste
parameter for nontraded goods (6^^ equal zero.—^ We demonstrate that labor
allocations to the traded goods sectors depend upon the distribution of the
productivity disturbances, but labor allocations»are invariant to the exchange
regime. Hiis section, then, supports Thursby's argument that exchange rate
changes do not induce resource movements between sectors. It is also shown
that expected utilities under the two regimes are equal, regardless of the
magnitude or source of disturbances.—^
Since 1^^ will be zero, substitute the condition 1^^ + ~ 1 into
equation 11). The first order condition for an interior solution is:
where:
11
defining ^ written as:
Since v^ and the a^^ are independent of the exchange regime, the solution
for the will be invariant to the exchange regime. Clearly, flexible
rates do not act to contract the export sector and expand the import-competing
sector: relative prices are equally variable under either exchange regime.
Because the productivity disturbances are assumed to be serially uncorrelated
and independently distributed, inspection of equation 18) indicates that the
amounts of labor allocated to each good will be time independent. In this
regard, our results are in accord with those of Thuraby. Any relative price
change in period t does not convey any information concerning prices in t+1.
As such, individuals do not perceive price change in t to reflect a permanent
change. Labor allocations respond to the distributions of the a^^ and a*^.
Resources will only move between sectors if there are changes in the
distribution of the productivity disturbances.
Given that labor supplies are constant and invariant to the exchange
regime, it is possible to demonstrate that expected utility levels are
invariant to the exchange regime. Using the commodity demand functions and
equation 9, the utility of a member of generation t will be:
= 0^1n(6^y^/2Pj^^) + * BjlnC
^ e2l"(Vt/2P2t+l^ (19)
where: + '^2t''2t output of good 3 are zero.
Since rearrangement yields
"t •= 21n(y^/P^^) + 2e^ln(0^/2) + 202ln(e2/2) -
+ ®2ln(Plt+l/P2t+l) •*" ^"^It " ^"^It+l
Note that the term =®lt^lt * ^c^2t^2t invariant to the exchange
regime since labor supplies, output disturbances, and relative prices are
identical under fixed and flexible rates.
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The difference between fixed and flexible rates (if any) is to be found in
comparing (InP^^^ - under the alternative exchange regimes. Thus:
As long as foreign prices are a stationary process, ^^ ~
that when the rate of exchange is fixed, ^ t ^ ~ flexible
exchange rates, the nominal money supply is constant. Multiply each side of
equation 9 by to obtain:
M/P^^ - (Ny^)/(2P^^) where: Mis the constant value of the money supply (22)
Thus:
^^lt+l^lt+1 ^ ^t+l®2t+1^2t+l^
As is the case for fixed rates: 1^^ ® ^it+1* both and ^re
identically and independently distributed. As long as foreign prices are
stationary, then ^ ~ expected utilities under the two
regimes are identical.
Fischer [3], Laffer [7], and Mundell [11] have argued that fixed rates
should be used if disturbances are real and internal, while flexible rates are
preferable, if disturbances are external. "Hie essence of the argument is that
flexible rates insulate an economy from external disturbances while internal
will be contained within the domestic economy. With fixed rates, external
disturbances will alter domestic prices, but individuals can save (via the
balance of trade/payments mechanism) when domestic output is randomly high in
order to consume when output is low. Our result showing that individuals are
indifferent to the exchange regime (regardless of the source of disturbances)
stems from two sources,—^ Recall that relative prices are invariant to the
exchange regime in a world of two traded goods: flexible rates no more
insulate the economy from relative price movements than do fixed rates.
Secondly, in the context of the intergenerational model, individuals can save
13
even if the exchange rate is flexible. Investigating the mechanisms by which
fixed and flexible rates allow individuals to transfer real purchasing power to
their retirement period illustrates the different forms of risk present in each
system.
With a fixed rate, the working generation can save through the balance of
trade mechanism as indicated by Fischer, Laffer, and Mundell. Money holdings
(savings) and utility of the working generation in t will be positively related
to the magnitudes of domestic productivity disturbances and foreign prices in
period t: the greater domestic productivity and foreign prices, the greater is
the income of the working generation. As domestic and foreign productivity
(and hence foreign prices) are uncorrelated, fixed rates allow for
international risk sharing during the work period. In considering the retired
generation, note that their value of real money holdings and utility will be
negatively related to the magnitude of foreign prices and unaffected by levels
of domestic outputs. The utilities of overlapping generations, then, will be
negatively correlated with fixed rates. If the exchange rate is flexible,,
utilities of overlapping generations will be positively correlated: flexible
rates allow for intergenerational risk sharing. While relative prices are
determined in the rest of the world, absolute price levels will be negatively
related to domestic productiviti.es. The real value of cash balances held by
the retired will be positively related to the output of the. workers. The
utility of an individual born at t will be positively related to proHwctivity
' " '1 "'1 in 1«J . j ii< »• '1 i nt III Ixi tli I'Ci I l <> (i<l I i J a l <; uII> | i- j n l <-<1 , I 1 I. I•
rales allow for i n!. rirj^onerat iona ) ri/ik Hlmrinj/,.
In the next sect Ion we reinlroductt nonLradtfd ^oods nnd hIiow I Iml r^'miurcj-
allocation paLLor.ns differ under the two exch.'inRe roginu's. One of llu' fncLorM
influencing the demand for nontradod goods is money biilancoH lic!«l hy I !><•
retired generation. As the money supply is consLanL with flexible rates but
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endogenous with fixed rates, demands and labor allocations will be time
dependent in a predictable way if the exchange rate is fixed. Labor
allocations will remain constant if the rate of exchange is flexible.
IV. Nontraded Goods
In this section we reintroduce nontraded goods. It will be shown that the
presence of nontraded goods act to break the equivalence of the two exchange
8 /regimes.— In any period, real commodity demands of the retired generation are
positively related to holdings of cash balances (see equation 6). In the event-
that the small country experiences a payments surplus in t-1, the working
generation in period t will anticipate a relatively large demand for
commodities. As. the only price which can be affected is the nontraded good's
price, the working generation in t will allocate more labor to nontraded goods
than if there had been payments equilibrium in period t-1. Under flexible
rates, however, the money supply is constant over time. As such, labor
allocations will be time dependent in a fixed rate system and time independent
under flexible rates. In the absence of a nontraded goods sector, a balance of
payments surplus in t-1 will have no effects upon relative prices that prevail
in period t, accounting for the constancy of the labor supplies in Section III.
It IS the presence, then, of nontraded goods which account for the time
dependency of the labor supply decisions shown below.
Consider flexible exchange rates: under flexible rates, equations 13, 14,
and 16 can be solved for the price of the nontraded good and the rate of
exchange: /"
= (2A)
™[1 - (25)
Equations 15. 16. 24. and 25 determine the distribution for prices that indi
viduals use in their labor supply decision. Substitute these four equations
15 /
into equations 12a and b to obtain the first order conditions for an interior
solution:
Adding 26a and 26b, and recalling that Z 1 = 1, the solution for labor
i=l
in the nontraded goods sector is:
St = ®3 (27)
Using 27) and either 26a or 26b, the solution for 1^^ is given by the value of
such that:
In many respects, the labor allocation decision with flexible rates and
nontraded goods is similar to our results in Section III above. Since a^^ and
serially uncorrelated, labor allocations to the traded goods sector
and 1^^) will be constant over time. This is to be contrasted to fixed rates
for which it will be shown that labor allocations are time dependent. In
addition:
i) The solution for 1^^ (and thus l^j.) will depend upon the
distributions of the domestic and foreign output disturbances. Thus,
the distribution of foreign outputs (prices) will affect the domestic
economy, even if the exchange rate is flexible. Flexible rates do
not insulate the domestic economy from external disturbances,
ii) Since equation 28) is not linear, specialization will not occur in
reference to only the mean of the probability distribution.-^''
Suppose that the small country has a comparative advantage in the
16
ex ante sense that ECa^^) < E(a^^) = E(a*^) = E(a*^). As we
demonstrate in the next section, the country may allocate more labor
to good 2 if the variance of good 2 is low relative to that of other
goods.
iii) It is the ratios of the domestic to foreign distubances which are
important. As such, if a^^ is distributed as and a*^ is
distributed as allocations to each of the two traded goods
sectors will be equal (1^^ = 1^^ - (1 - 02)/2). If the domestic
economy is uniformly more or less variable than the rest of the
world, labor allocations will not change.
Under fixed exchange rates, the situation is quite different. Substitute
equations 13, 15, and 16 into 12a and 12b to obtain:
b. E 3 t 2t' ^ It 2t' 3'' 2t,
0 (29)
Given the money supply in t and the distribution of a^^ and a*^, equations 29a
and 29b can be solved for 1^^. 1^^, and (as tl = l)^^. However, with a fixed
exchange rate, the money supply will not be constant over time. Of particular
importance is the fact that the money supply at t is in the information set of
the working generation in t at the time the labor supply decision is made.
Note that lagging equation 14) one period yields the money supply at t (m^. or
Nm^.) in terms of events in t-1. Thus, in marked contrast to flexible rates,
the solutions for the 1^^ will be changing over time if the exchange rate is
fixed. As opposed to the results of Kreinen and Heller, Lanyi, and Thursby,
17
there is more variation in resource allocations with fixed rates than with
flexible rates.
In equations 29a and b, the expectations operator runs over the a^^ and a*^
but not the or - the 1^^ are choice variables and is in the
information set at t. Given the distributions of the a^^ and inspection
of 29a shows that the larger is m , the smaller is the sum of 1^^ and l2^(i.e.,
the greater is 13^.)* The greater the current value of the money supply, the
larger the expected output of the nontraded good (from equation 3, q^^ ~
^3t^3t^* " money supply is above its mean value, workers anticipate the
above average demand for the nontraded good and allocate more labor to that
sector.
As labor allocations are time dependent when the exchange rate is fixed,
questions.concerning the effects of the exchange regime on sector size must be *
answered in reference to average (or expected) sector size. Unfortunately, it
is not possible to explicitly solve for the expected labor allocations unless
the distributions and realizations of the productivity disturbances are
specified. We tackle this problem in Section V by simulating the model using
Monte Carlo techniques.
V. Simulating the Model
As shown above, under flexible exchange rates the allocation of labor
to each of the traded goods will depend upon the distributions of the domestic
and" foreign productivity disturbances. Under fixed rates, labor allocations to
all three sectors will depend upon the distributions and realizations of.the
productivity disturbances. The realizations of the productivity disturbances
are important under fixed rates since the small country's money supply will
respond to differences in realized outputs across countries.
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Since labor allocations are not distribution-free, our simulation results
are designed to be illustrative as opposed to definitive. We assume that all
productivity disturbances are binomially distributed. In providing simulation
results, we would like to be able to use a commonly used distribution. A
second reason for using the binomial is its simplicity and concurrent savings
in computer costs. Lastly, we have experimented with several multinomial
distributionsj they yield the same qualitative results as the binonij.al.
While all productivity disturbances are assumed to be drawn from the
binomial distribution, the means and/or variances of the distributions are
I
allowed to differ across countries and commodities. Specification of the
parameters of each distribution allows us to solve for labor supplies under
flexible rates. With fixed exchange rates, it is also necessary to know the
particular realizations of the output disturbances in order to generate the
money supply and labor allocations for each time period. After simulating the
model for fifty periods, the mean values of labor allocations have been
calculated and are reported in the following tables as expected labor
allocations under fixed exchange rates: E(l^^). As allocations are time
independent with flexible rates, they are reported as 1^.
Table 1 indicates how labor allocations depend upon the share of nontraded
goods in consumption It is assumed that all disturbances have a mean of
unity and that 0^ = 02. There is a 50% chance that any disturbance will take
on the value of .5 and a 50% chance that it will be 1.5.
Since all distributions are identical, the labor allocations under
flexible rates are such that l^" ©^^^d 1~ ^2~ under fixed
rates, 1^^ = l2t' expected, the table shows that labor allocated to the
nontraded goods sector is positively related to ^0^ under either regime. All
else equal, the greater is 6^, the greater will be the demand for nontraded
goods.
19
Table 1: Labor Allocations and the Share of Nontraded Goods—^
2/
Fixed Rates— Flexible Rates
le 0f 02 ECl^t^ Ed^t) E(l3t) ^L3,M 4 ^2 ^3
0.0 .5 .5 0. - .5 .5 0
.1 .444 .444 .112 .9999 .45 .45 .1
.2 .391 .391 .219 .9997 .4 .4 .2
.3 .339 .339 .322 .9995 .35 .35 .3
.4 .289 .289 .422 .9993 .3 .3 .4
.5 .240 .240 .520 .9992 .25 .25 .5
.6 .195 .195 .611 .9602 .2 .2 .6
.7 .145 .145 .709 .9576 .15 .15 ,7
.8 .091 .091 .818 .9025 .1 .1 .8
1. The mean and variance of all productivity disturbances are 1.0 and .25
respectively. It is also assumed that 6^ = 62 = (1 -
2. For fixed rates, labor allocations may not sura to unity because of
rounding.
20
The column labeled « ,, shows the simulated value of the correlation
L3,M
coefficient between the money supply in a period and the amount of labor
allocated to the nontraded goods sector in that period (as the money supply is
constant, with flexible rates, there is not a corresponding column for the
flexible rate case). The large value of the correlation coefficient supports
the claim that the demand for nontraded goods is positively related to the
domestic money supply. Agents respond by allocating more labor to the
nontraded goods sector in periods for which the demand for the nontraded'good
is expected to be above average. As the demand for the nontraded good is
positively related to the money supply, labor allocated to this sector is also
positively related to the money supply.
Perhaps the most striking result in Table 1 is that the average amount of
labor in the nontraded good sector is greater (unless 9^ = 0) with a fixed
rate than with a flexible rate. Thus, fixed rates - on average - increase the
size of the nontraded good sector. It cannot be claimed that flexible rates
always allocate resources away from sectors in which there is exchange risk:
rather exchange risk is endogenous. Using equations 24) and 27), under
flexible rates the price of the nontraded good is = 2M/a2^. The price of
the nontraded good is singularly determined by the productivity disturbance in
that sector. Domestic currency prices of traded goods [e P* and e P? ] are
t ^ tell
determined by conditions in both countries (see equation 25). With a fixed
rate, the situation is reversed: traded goods prices are determined by
productivity disturbances in the traded'good sector [P-,^ = P* = 1/a^ and P« .
«l*tl It
~ ^2^ ~ while the price of the nontraded good depends upon current
disturbances and (through the money supply effect) events in previous periods.
Risk-averse individuals, then, tend to allocate more labor to the nontraded
good sector when the exchange rate is fixed than when the rate is flexible. It
is the different channels by which prices are determined under the two regimes
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which lead to different price distributions and resource allocations. While
not reported in the table, the price of the nontraded good was not found to be
serially correlated with a fixed rate. When labor allocations are exogenous
(as in Enders and Lapan [2]), prices will be serially correlated. In a
rational expectations framework with serially uncorrelated productivity
disturbances and "costless" labor reallocations, labor movements between
sectors will tend to eliminate any predictability (serial correlation) in
prices.
Table 2 indicates how changes in the relative variability of foreign to
domestic output disturbances alters labor allocations. The means of the
productivity disturbances (both domestic and foreign) are all unity, but the
variance of the foreign productivity disturbances increase as one reads down
the table. As in Table 1, in Table 2 we assume that domestic output
disturbances have a 50% chance of taking on the value of .5 and a 50% change of
being 1.5. Under flexible rates, all labor allocations are constant (1^ = 9^,
i = 1,3) over time. With fixed rates, the greater the variability of foreign
to domestic output, the more labor is allocated to the nontraded goods sector.
Risk-averse individuals are acting to avoid the risks of foreign price
variability by producing nontraded as opposed to traded goods. Table 2 acts to
reinforce the main point of Table 1. Note that even if foreign disturbances
are less variable than domestic disturbances, more labor is allocated to the
nontraded goods sector with fixed rates than with flexible rates. To explain,
recall that from equation 15), invariant to the exchange
regime. Uniformly increasing the variability of foreign prices affects this
relative price equally in the two exchange regimes. Yet, the argument made
previously remains in" force: with fixed (flexible) rates, the price of each
traded (the nontraded) good is determined in a single market.
22
Table 2: Labor allocations and the variability of foreign outputL/
Fixed Rates Flexible- Rates
2/
Foreign Output— E(l^^) E(l2,) E<l3t) h 4 ^3
(.1)^- .01 .3265 .3265 .3470 1/3 1/3 1/3
(.2)^ .3264 .3264 .3472 1/3 1/3 1/3
(.3)^ .3257 .3257 .3486 1/3 1/3 1/3
(.4)^ .3243 .3243 .3514 1/3 1/3 1/3
(.5)^ .3221 .3221 .3557 1/3 1/3 1/3
(.6)^ .3190 .3190 .3621 1/3 1/3 1/3
(.7)2 .3143 .3143 .3714 1/3 1/3 1/3
(.8)^ .3074 .3074 .3852 i/3 1/3 1/3
The mean of all productivity disturbances are unity. The variance of all
domestic disturbances is (.5). Also in the table, all 6^ are equal to
1/3.
Both foreign output disturbances have a .5 probability of taking on the
value 1-Zor 1+Z. The variance of each foreign disturbance is (Z)^. All
disturbances are uncorrelated.
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In Table 3 we change the mean and variance of one of the traded goods
(good 2).' We spare the reader another explanation of why more labor is '
allocated to the nontraded good with fixed, as opposed to flexible, rates. Not
I
surprisingly, the table indicates that increasing the mean or decreasing the
variance of good 2 acts to increase the amount of labor allocated to good 2 and
decrease the amount of labor allocated to good 1. If comparative advantage is
measured by the means of the productivity disturbances, a nation may tend to
specialize in the good for which it has a comparative disadvantage if the
variance of that good is low. To illustrate, let E(a2^) = .9 and Var(a2^.) =
2 • 2
(.5) while all other disturbances have a mean of 1.0 and variance of (.5) .
From row 11 in the table it is seen that labor allocations to goods 1 and 2 are
.4213 and .2454 with flexible rates and expected allocations with fixed rates
as .4188 and .2219 respectively. Under either regime, more labor is allocated
to the sector in which there is a comparative advantage. However, if the
1 2
variance of falls to (.1) , more labor is allocated to the good in which
there is a comparative disadvantage (.3215 and .3296 for fixed rates and .3071
and .3596 for flexible rates).
The table also indicates that there tends to be more specialization in
accord with comparative advantage when the exchange rate is fixed. Define:
S = E(l^^)/E(l2^) T l^/l^
The value of S, or the specialization ratio, measures the extent to which
specialization occurs under the alternative exchange regimes. When S > 1,
relatively more labor is allocated to good 1 than good 2 with a fixed rate than
I
with a flexible rate. From the last column in Table 3, -it is seen |that when
there is.a comparative advantage in good 1, the specialization coefficient is
greater than unity, and when there is a comparative advantage in good 2 the
specialization coefficient is less than unity. To explain why fixed rates are
more conducive to specialization in accord with comparative advantage, recall
of
Good ly
.8
l.O
1.1
1,2
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Table 3: Labor Allocations and Asymmetric Means and Variancea '^^
Fixed Rates Flexible Rates sl^
iance of
ood 2
E(li^) E(l3t) I2 ^3
.1 2= .01 .4359 .2076 .3565 .4038 .2628 1/3 1.367
.2 2 .4480 .1938 .3582 .4197 .2470 1/3 1.360
.3 2 .4784 .1687 .3529 .4443 .2223 1/3 1.419
.4
2
.4951 .1537 .3512 .4752 .1915 1/3 1.298
.5
2
.5177 .1290 .3534 .5086 .1581 1/3 1.248
.6 2 ,5526 .0929 .3545 .5405 .1262 1/3 1.388
.1 2 .3215 .3296 .3489 .3071 .3596 1/3 1.142
.2
2
.3357 .3139 .3503 .3280 .3437 1/3 1.138
.3
2 .3582 .2891 .3527 .3485 .3182 1/3 1.131
.4 2 .3868 .2574 .3558 .3821 .2846 1/3 1.119
.5
2
.4188 .2219 .3593 .4213 .2454 1/3 1.099
.6 2 .4427 .1852 .3721 .4628 .2038 1/3 1.053
.1
2
.2179 .4351 .3470 .2210 .4457 1/3 1.010
.2
2 .2322 .4198 .3480 .2360 .4307 1/3 1.009
.3
2
.2553 .3948 .3499 .2603 .4063 1/3 1.009
.4 2 .2859 .3616 .3525 .2932 .3734 1/3 1.009
.5 2 .3221 .3221 .3557 .3333 .3333 1/3 1.000
.6 2 .3617 .2791 .3592 .3786 .2881 1/3 .986
.1
2
0
.1256 .5253 .3491 .1454 .5212 1/3 .857
.2 2
A
.1392 .5111 .3497 .1591 .5076 1/3 .869
.3
2
.1612 .4878 .3510 .1815 .4852 1/3 .883
.4 2
A
.1910 .4560 .3530 .2121 .4545 1/3 .898
.5 2 .2275 .4169 .3556 .2503 .4163 1/3 .908
.6 2 .2693 .3722 .3585 .2950 .3717 1/3 .911
.1
2
.0437 .6024 .3538 .0795 .5871 1/3 .536
.2
2
.0576 .5826 .3598 .0920 .5747 1/3 .618
.3
2
.0765 .5683 .3552 .1123 .5544 1/3 .665
.4
2
rt
.1048 .5388 .3564 .1400 .5266 1/3 .732
, 5 2
rt
.1395 .5022 .3583 .1751 .4916 1/3 .780
.6
2
.1801 .4593 .3606 .2168 .4499 1/3 .814
1. It is assumed that e-j^ - 8^ ~ 63 ~ i/3. Further, all productivity disturbances,
other than that of domestic production of good 2 have a mean of unity and
variance of (.5)^.
2. The distribution of good 2 is such that it has a 50% chance of taking on values
mean-Z and mean+E.
3. The speciaii zaL ion coefficient is ^^ ^
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that iradable prices in the small country are invariant to productivity. If
the mean disturbance of good 2 is low relative to that of good 1, individuals
can allocate more labor to good I without altering the expected marginal value
product. Under flexible rates, the more labor allocated to a sector, the lower
the expected price in that sector (of course, in equilibrium relative tradable
prices will be invariant to the exchange regime). Thus, if the mean of the
disturbance to good 2 is low (high) relative to that of good 1, less (more)
labor will be allocated good 2 with a flexible rate.
From equations 12-15, labor allocations do not depend upon the
distribution of the disturbances in the nontraded goods sector.—^ Since it is
the ratios of foreign to domestic disturbances which are important, it is
not necessary to repeat Tables 2 and 3 for domestic and foreign disturbances
respectively. Thus, Tables 1-3 characterize the labor allocation decision for
all cases of the binomial distribution. The remaining issue, then, concerns
expected utility comparison under the two regimes. As shown in Section III,
individuals would be indifferent to the two regimes if the share of nontraded
goods was zero. Intuition suggests that if the share of nontraded goods was
unity, the two regimes would be identical. Our simulation results indicate
that for any 0<0^ <1, fixed rates are preferable to flexible rates.—^ While
the degree of risk aversion is also an important determinant of the choice
between exchange regimes (see Lapan and Enders [9]), our results indicate that
the presence of nontraded goods favors fixed rates. Again, fixed rates spread
the risks of nontraded good variability more effectively than flexible rates.
Consider a random increase in productivity of the nontraded good. Under either
regime, the price of the nontraded good would fall and both generations would
consume more of the nontraded good, while the higher income of the working
generation would induce them to consume more tradables as well. With fixed
rates, the increase demand for tradables would not affect the retired
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generation. With flexible rates, absolute prices of tradables would rise, to
the detriment of the retired generation.
VI. Conclusions
Using a utility maximizing framework, we have investigated resource
allocation under fixed and flexible exchange rates. We have shown that the
size of the nontraded good sector is an endogenous variable, depending upon the
sources and distributions of disturbances as well as the exchange regime
itself. It is not appropriate to use the "openness" of an economy as the
criterion to assess the relative merits of fixed versus flexible rates: the
extent to which an econony is open will depend upon current exchange rate
policy. We have also shown that economies with flexible rates will appear to
be more open than economies with fixed rates. With flexible rates, the price
of nontraded goods will primarily be determined by events in the nontraded
goods sector, but tradable prices will be determined by domestic and foreign
events. With fixed rates, however, tradable prices will be determined by
foreign events while the price of the nontraded good will be determined by
domestic and foreign events. Risk-averse individuals will allocate more
resources to the nontraded good sector if the exchange rate is fixed. This,
result contrasts with the argument that a flexible rate increases uncertainty
and leads to less trade and specialization.
It has been claimed that flexible exchange rates lead to more
interindustry resource movements than fixed rates. Our results argue the
reverse:, resource allocations will be constant with flexible rates but
responsive to the balance of payments when the exchange rate is fixed. The
resource movements that occur with fixed rates, however, cannot be called
I
"unnecessary". With fixed rates, resources move in anticipation of changes in
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demand for nontraded goods. If anything, such reallocations are socially
useful.
While we believe that our model yields some interesting implications about
resource allocation under fixed versus flexible rates, additional work needs to
be done in this area. Under flexible rates, labor allocations were shown to be
unchanging over time. If we had assumed that productivity disturbances were
serially correlated, labor allocations under either regime would be serially
correlated. Uncorreiated disturbances were assumed in order to highlight the
greater pressure for resource movements with fixed rates. We have also assumed
a very specific form for the utility function. It would be desirable to extend
our results to differing degrees of risk aversion and commodity
substitutability. To date we have not been able to extend the results in this
direction. Lastly, it would be of interest to introduce other factors of
production and other stores of value into our framework. In spite of these
qualifications, we believe that an intergenerational model of the sort
developed in this paper yields several new insights into resource allocation
under alternative exchange regimes.
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Footnotes
* Respectively, the authors are Associate Professor and Professor of Economics
at Iowa State University. This material is based upon work supported by the
National Science Foundation under Grant Soc-7907066. We would like to thank
the National Science Foundation for their generous support.
1. The model used extended Fischer's [3] monetary model of the balance of
payments. Within Fischer's framework, it is possible to explicitly model '
the effects of internal and external disturbances on the domestic
econony.
2. This .result follows from our assumptions that resource adjustments are
costless, the underlying disturbances are serially uncorrelated, and
individuals use the price distributions in allocating their labor time.
If sectoral productivity disturbances were serially correlated, prices
would also be serially correlated in order for expected marginal products
to be equal across sectors.
3. As is well known from the work of Kareken and Wallace [5] and Helpman and
Razin. [4], if domestics can hold foreign currency, fixed and flexible
rates are identical in all respects. In order to avoid this difficulty,
we assume that domestics hold only domestic currency,
4. In Lapan and Enders [9] we show that in a one-good world the degree of
relative risk aversion is crucial in the determination of whether expected
utility is greater with a fixed rate or with a flexible rate. If the
degree of relative risk aversion wasequal to unity, expected utility
-under the two regimes would be identical. Increasing risk aversion acts
to favor flexible rates, and decreasing risk aversion favors fixed rates.
Adding two sectors to the model greatly complicates the analysis: for
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tracLabi1ity we use a utility function for which the degree of relative
risk aversion is unity. As such, we refrain from making normative
conclusions about the exchange regimes.
Clearly the relevant labor supply decision is for ^2 " fiince the
demand for nontraded goods will be zero.
6. Differing degrees of relative risk aversion would alter this result; see
footnote 4. In essence, we extend Lapan and Enders [9] to a two traded
goods world
7. Again, we remind the reader that the degree of relative risk aversion is
important for this result. However, investigating the reasons why
expected utilities are equal helps to clarify the labor allocation effects
of the next section.
8. In the absence of nontraded goods, the exchange regimes yield identical
labor allocations and expected utilities. Realized utility and the amount
of each good consumed will depend upon the realizations of the
productivity disturbances and the exchange regime.
9. A similar result is obtained by Turnovsky [14].
10. Hiis result depends upon the form of the utility function. If the
elasticity of substitution differs from unity, labor allocations will
depend upon disturbances in other sectors. We have not been able to solve
the system for the case in which the elasticity of substitution differs
from unity.
11. A table of these results has not been included in order to save space.
Interested readers are welcome to write for such tables and the computer
program used to generate our simulation results. Furthermore, we have not
reported the simulated values of the serial correlation for the price of
the nontraded good. There was never any significant serial correlation in
any of our simulations.
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